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Abstract. In the light of ongoing progresses of research on artificial in-
telligent systems exhibiting a steadily increasing problem-solving ability,
the identification of practicable solutions to the value alignment problem
in AGI Safety is becoming a matter of urgency. In this context, one pre-
eminent challenge that has been addressed by multiple researchers is the
adequate formulation of utility functions or equivalents reliably capturing
human ethical conceptions. However, the specification of suitable utility
functions harbors the risk of “perverse instantiation” for which no final
consensus on responsible proactive countermeasures has been achieved so
far. Amidst this background, we propose a novel socio-technological eth-
ical framework denoted Augmented Utilitarianism which directly allevi-
ates the perverse instantiation problem. We elaborate on how augmented
by AI and more generally science and technology, it might allow a society
to craft and update ethical utility functions while jointly undergoing a
dynamical ethical enhancement. Further, we elucidate the need to con-
sider embodied simulations in the design of utility functions for AGIs
aligned with human values. Finally, we discuss future prospects regard-
ing the usage of the presented scientifically grounded ethical framework
and mention possible challenges.
Keywords: AGI Safety, Utility Function, Perverse Instantiation, AI
Alignment, Augmented Utilitarianism
1 Motivation
The problem of unambiguously specifying human goals for advanced AI sys-
tems such that these systems once deployed, do not violate the implicitly under-
lying intended human conceptions by pursuing unforeseen solutions, has been
referred to as “literalness”[32,43] or also “perverse instantiation” [10,42] prob-
lem. A higher problem solving ability does not necessarily entail the integration
of the contextual knowledge required from an advanced AI in order to accu-
rately interpret human ethical conceptions. Therefore, it is of great importance
from the perspective of A(G)I Safety and A(G)I Ethics to a priori consider this
crucial issue when crafting utility functions for intelligent systems that would
operate based on the human goals these functions encode. Recently, a novel
type of such quantitative utility functions denoted ethical goal functions [2,41]
has been introduced as critical tool for a society to achieve a meaningful control
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of autonomous intelligent systems aligned with human ethical values. Depart-
ing from this, we show why in order to design ethical goal functions and avoid
perverse instantiation scenarios, one needs a novel type of ethical framework for
the utility elicitation on whose basis these functions are crafted. We introduce a
new to be described socio-technological ethical framework denoted Augmented
Utilitarianism (which we abbreviate with AU in the following).
While multiple methods have been suggested as moral theory approaches to
achieve ethical objective functions for AGIs [16,17] (including classical ethical
frameworks like consequentialism or encompassing methods based on uncertain
objectives and moral uncertainty [9,15]), most approaches do not provide a fun-
damental solution to the underlying problem which wrongly appears to be solely
of philosophical nature. According to Goertzel [20], “pithy summaries of complex
human values evoke their commonly accepted meanings only within the human
cultural context”. More generally, we argue that in order to craft utility functions
that should not lead to a behavior of advanced AI systems violating human ethi-
cal intuitions, one has to scientifically consider relevant contextual and embodied
information. Moreover, it could be highly valuable to take into account human
biases and constraints that obstruct ethical decision-making and attempt to re-
mediate resulting detrimental effects using science and technology. In contrast
to the AU approach we will present, most currently known moral theories and
classical ethical frameworks considered for advanced AI systems do not integrate
these decisive elements and might therefore riskily not exhibit a sufficient safety
level with regard to perverse instantiation.
2 Deconstructing Perverse Instantiation
In the following, we enumerate (using the generic notation < FinalGoal > :
< PerverseInstantiation >) a few conceivable perverse instantion scenarios
that have been formulated in the past:
1. “Make us smile” : “Paralyze human facial musculatures into constant beam-
ing smiles” (example by Bostrom [10])
2. “Make us happy” : “Implant electrodes into the pleasure centers of our
brains” (example by Bostrom [10])
3. “Making all people happy” : “Killing all people [...] as with zero people
around all of them are happy” (example by Yampolskiy [43])
4. “Making all people happy” : “Forced lobotomies for every man, woman and
child [...]” (example by Yampolskiy [43])
From our view, one could extract the following two types of failures out of the
specified perverse instantiations: misspecification of final goal criteria and the so
called perspectival fallacy of utility assignment [2] which will become apparant in
our explanation. First, one could argue that already the proposed formulations
regarding the criteria of the final goal do not optimally capture the nature of the
intended sense from a scientific perspective which might have finally misguided
the AI. While the concept of happiness certainly represents a highly ambiguous
construct, modern research in the field of positive psychology [29,36,40], hedonic
psychology [23] and further research areas offers a scientific basis to assess what
it means for human entities. For instance, one might come to the conclusion that
a highly desirable final goal of humanity for a superintelligence rather represents
a concept which is close to the notion of “well-being”. In psychology, well-being
has been among others described as a construct consisting of five measurable
elements: positive emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning and achieve-
ment (PERMA) [39]. Another known psychological measure for well-being is
subjective well-being [30] (SWB) which is composed of frequent positive affect,
infrequent negative affect and life satisfaction [11,13]. In both cases, happiness
only represents a subelement of the respective well-being construct. Similarly,
as stated by Diener and Bieswas-Diener [14], “happiness alone is not enough;
people need to be happy for the right reasons”. Coming back to the provided
examples for perverse instantiation, in the cases 1, 2 and 4, it is implausible that
a pluralistic criteria of well-being like PERMA would have been met.
Second, it is however important to note that even if the final goal would have
been specified in a way reflecting psychological insights, a perverse instantiation
cannot necessarily be precluded without more ado. By way of illustration, we
correspondingly reformulate the example 3 within a new type of perverse instan-
tiation and provide an additional example. We thereby use the term “flourish” to
allude to the achievement of a high level of well-being in line with a psychological
understanding of the concept as exemplified in the last paragraph.
5. Make all people flourish : Killing all people
6. Make all people flourish : Initiate a secret genocide until the few uninformed
people left in future generations all flourish
Despite a suitable final goal, value alignment is not succesful in 5 and 6 because
the underlying assignment of utility seems to be based on a detached modus
operandi in which the effects of scenarios on the own current mental states of
the people generating this function are ignored. Thereby, it is assumed that dur-
ing utility assignment, the involved people are considered as remote observers,
while at the same time one inherently takes their perspective while referring to
this mapping with the emotionally connoted description of a perverse instan-
tiation. This type of detached design of utility functions ignoring i.a. affective
and emotional parameters of the own mental state has been described as be-
ing subject to the perspectival fallacy of utility assignment [2]. Although most
people would currently dislike all provided examples 1-6, the aggregated mental
states of their current selves seem not to be reflected within the utility function
of the AI which instead considered a synthetic detached measure only related to
their future selves or/and future living people. In the next paragraph, we briefly
introduce a known problem in population ethics that exhibits similar patterns
and which might be of interest for the design of utility functions for advanced
AI systems in certain safety-relevant application areas [15].
Population ethics [21] is an issue in philosophy concerning decision-making
that potentially leads to populations with varying numbers or/and identities
of their members. One interesting element of a population ethics theory is the
derived population axiology which represents the total order of different popu-
lation states according to their ethical desirability. As an example, consider the
choice of either perform a policy measure that leads to a population A of ca.
10 billion members and a very high positive welfare or to rather prefer another
policy measure leading to a population Z of ca. 10.000 billion members and a
much lower only barely acceptable (but still positive) welfare. Intuitively, most
people would rank the policy measure leading to population A as higher than
the one leading to population Z. However, given the population axiology of total
utilitarianism [21], Z might well be ranked higher than A if the number of people
multiplied by their welfare is bigger for population Z in comparison to popula-
tion A. This type of violation of human ethical intuitions when applying total
utilitarianism to population ethics has been termed “Repugnant Conclusion” by
Derik Parfit [35]. In this context, Arrhenius [3] proved in one of his impossibil-
ity theorems that no population axiology1 can be formulated that concurrently
satisfies a certain number of ethical desiderata.
However, as shown by Aliman and Kester [2], this type of impossibility the-
orem does not apply to population axiologies that take the mental states of
those attempting to craft the total orders during utility elicitation into account.
Similarly to the perverse instantiation examples 1-6, the application of e.g. to-
tal utilitarianism to the described scenario is subject to the perspectival fallacy
of utility assignment. As in the case of these perverse instantiations, the fact
that most people consider the scenario involving population Z as repugnant is
not reflected in the utility function which only includes a detached measure of
the well-being of future people. In practice, how humans rate the ethical de-
sirability of for instance a policy measure leading to a certain population, is
dependent on the effect the mental simulation of the associated scenario has on
their corresponding mental states which inherently encode e.g. societal, cultural
and temporal information. For instance, from the perspective of a current pop-
ulation Z0 being similar to population Z both with regard to number of people
and welfare level, it might instead be “repugnant” to prefer the policy measure
leading to population A [2]. The reason being that the scenario leading from Z0
to A might have included a dying out or even a genocide. The lack of the required
contextual information in consequentialist frameworks (such as utilitarianism)
has implications for AIs and AGIs that are implemented in the form of expected
utility maximizers mostly operating in a consequentialist fashion.
3 Augmenting Utilitarianism
In the light of the above, it appears vital to refine classical utilitarianism (CU) if
one intends to utilize it as basis for utility functions that do not lead to perverse
instantiation scenarios. However, as opposed to classical ethical frameworks, AU
does not represent a normative theory aimed at specifying what humans ought
to do. In fact, its necessity arises directly from a technical requirement for the
1 Importantly, this also applies to non-consequentialist frameworks such as deontolog-
ical ethics [21].
meaningful control of artificial intelligent systems equipped with a utility func-
tion. Since the perverse instantiation problem represents a significant constraint
to the design of ethical goal functions, a novel tailored ethical framework able to
alleviate issues related to both misspecification of final goal criteria and perspec-
tival fallacy of utility assignment emerges as exigency. With this in mind, AU
is formulated as a non-normative ethical framework for AGI Safety which can
be augmented by the use of science and technology in order to facilitate a dy-
namical societal process of crafting and updating ethical goal functions. Instead
of specifying what an agent ought to do, AU helps to identify what the current
society should want an (artificial or human) agent to do if this society wants to
maximize expected utility. In this connection, utility could ideally represent a
generic scientifically grounded (possibly aggregated) measure capturing one or
more ethically desirable final goal(s) as defined by society itself. In the following,
we describe by what type of components AU could augment CU:
– Scientific grounding of utility: According to Jeremy Bentham [7], the founder
of CU ”by the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears
to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest
is in question”. For AU, one could for instance reformulate the principle of
utility by substituting “happiness” with a generic scientific measure for one
or more final goal(s). In the context of crafting ethical goal functions, the
party whose interest is in question is society. Further, a crucial difference
between CU and AU is that in order to assess the tendency an action has
to augment or diminish the chosen ethical measure, AU considers more than
just the outcome of that action as used in the classical sense, since AU pre-
supposes the mental-state-dependency [2] of utility as will be expounded in
the next subitem. With this application-oriented view, one could then argue
that what society should ideally want an agent to do are actions that are con-
formable to this modified mental-state-dependent principle of utility. In this
paper, we exemplarily consider well-being as reasonable high level final goal
candidate which is e.g. already reflected in the UN Sustainable Developmen-
tal Goals (SDGs) [45] and is in the spirit of positive computing [12]. Besides
SWB and PERMA, multiple measures of well-being exist in psychology with
focus on different well-being factors. For instance, the concept of objective
happiness [23] has been proposed by Kahneman. Well-being has moreover
been linked to the hierarchy of needs of Abraham Maslow which he extended
to contain self-transcendence at the highest level on top of self-actualization
in his later years [26,27,31]. (Recently, related AI research aiming at induc-
ing self-transcendent states for users has been considered by among others
Mossbridge and Goertzel [33].) For a review on relevant well-being factors
that might be pivotal for a dedicated positive computing, see Calvo and
Peters [11].
– Mental-state-dependency: As adumbrated in the last section, human ethi-
cal evaluation of an outcome of an action is related to their mental states
which take into account the simulation that led to this outcome. The mental
phenomenon of actively simulating different alternative scenarios (including
anticipatory emotions [6]) has been termed conceptual consumption [19] and
plays a role in decision-making. Similarly, according to Johnson [22] “moral
deliberation is a process of cognitive conative affective simulation”. More-
over, it has been shown that for diverse economical and societal contexts,
people do not only value the outcome of actions but also assign a well-being
relevant procedural utility [18,25] to the policy that led to these outcomes.
In light of this, AU assigns utility at a higher abstraction level by – simply
put – considering the underlying state transition (from starting state over
action to outcome) instead of the outcome alone as in classical consequential
frameworks like CU. Furthermore, according to constructionist approaches
in neuroscience [5], the brain constructs mental states based on “sensations
from the world, sensations from the body, and prior experience” [34]. Hence,
it is conceivable that ethical judgements might vary from person to person
and from society to society with respect to multiple parameters of different
nature including e.g. psychological, biographical, cultural, temporal, social
and physiological information. Likewise, the recent Moral Machine experi-
ment studying human ethical conceptions on trolley case scenarios with i.a.
autonomous vehicles showed “substantial cultural variations” in the exhib-
ited moral preferences [4]. Ethical frameworks for AGI utility functions that
disregard the mental-state-dependency may more likely lead to perverse in-
stantiations, since they ignore what we call the embodied nature of ethical
total orders which AU2 attempts to consider.
– Debiasing of utility assignment: One might regard decision utility based on
observed choices (as exhibited e.g. in big data) as sufficient utility source
for a possible instantiation of AU if one assumes that humans are ratio-
nal agents that already act as to optimize what increases their well-being.
However, utility as measured from this third-person perspective might not
capture the actual experienced utility from a first-person perspective due to
multiple human cognitive biases [8,24]. Since it is impossible to directly ex-
tract the instant utility (the basic building block of experienced utility [24])
of future outcomes to craft ethical goal functions, AU could – in its most
basic implementation – rely on predicted utility which represents the belief
on the future experienced utility people would assign to a given scenario
from a first-person perspective. However, the mental simulations on whose
basis predicted utility is extracted are still distorted among others due to
the fact that humans fail to accurately predict their appreciation of future
scenarios [24]. Therefore, it has been suggested by Aliman and Kester [2]
to augment the utility elicitation process by the utilization of technologies
like virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) within a simulation
environment in order to be able to get access to a less biased artificially sim-
ulated future instant utility. Analogous to the AI-aided policy-by-simulation
approach [41], this technique might offer a powerful preemptive tool for AGI
2 Thereby, it is important to note that AU is not conceived as an attempt to “conse-
quentialise” [37] multiple classical ethical frameworks
Safety in an AU framework. Overall, the experience of possible future world
scenarios might improve the quality of utility assignment while having the
potential to yield an ethical enhancement for one thing due to the debiased
view on the future and secondly, for instance due to beneficial effects that
immersive technologies might have on prosocial behavior including certain
forms of empathy [12,28]. (Interestingly, the experience of individualized and
tailored simulations itself might provide an alternative simulation-based so-
lution to the value alignment problem as specified by Yampolskiy [44].)
– Self-reflexivity: As opposed to CU, AU is intended as a self-reflexive ethi-
cal framework which augments itself. Due to the mental-state-dependency it
incorporates and the associated embodied nature of ethical total orders, it
might even be necessary to craft new ethical goal functions within a so-called
socio-technological feedback-loop [2]. In doing so, ongoing technological pro-
gresses might help to augment the debiasing of utility assignment while novel
scientific insights might facilitate to filter out the most sophisticated mea-
sure for the ethically desired form of utility given the current state of society.
Advances in A(G)I development itself leading to a higher problem solving
ability might further boost AU with an improved predictability of future
outcomes leading to more precise ethical goal functions. Given its generic
nature, what humans should want an agent to do might thereby vary qual-
itatively in an AU framework, since quantitatively specifiable observations
at specific time steps within a socio-technological feedback-loop might even
lead society to modify the desired final goal candidate(s) making it possible
to ameliorate the framework as time goes by.
Ethics Framework / Focus Agent Action Outcome Experiencer S&T
Virtue Ethics x
Deontological Ethics x
Consequentialist Ethics (e.g. CU) x
AU x x x x x
Table 1. Decision-making focuses within different possible ethical frameworks for AGI.
“S&T” denotes a foreseen augmentation of the ethical decision making process by
science and technology including A(G)I itself. By “experiencer”, we refer to the entities
in society performing the ethical evaluation via the experience of simulations (in a
mental mode only or augmented).
– Amalgamation of diverse perspectives: Finally, we postulate that AU3, de-
spite its intrinsically different motivation as a socio-technological ethical
3 AU is not be to confused with agent-relative consequentialism which is a normative
agent-based framework, does not foresee a grounding in science and seems to assume
a “pretheoretical grasp” [38] of its “better-than-relative-to” relation
framework for AGI Safety and its non-normative nature, can be neverthe-
less understood as allowing a coalescence of diverse theoretical perspectives
that have been historically assigned to normative ethical frameworks. To
sum up and contextualize the experiencer-based AU, Table 1 provides an
overview on the different decision-making focuses used in relevant known
ethical frameworks (including CU) that might be seen as candidates for AGI
Safety.
4 Conclusion and Future Prospects
In a nutshell, we proposed AU as a novel non-normative socio-technological ethi-
cal framework grounded in science which is conceived for the purpose of crafting
ethical utility functions for AGI Safety. While CU and other classical ethical
frameworks if used for AGI utility functions might engender the perverse instan-
tiation problem, AU directly tackles this issue. AU augments CU by the following
main elements: scientific grounding of utility, mental-state-dependency, debias-
ing of utility assignment using technology, self-reflexivity and amalgamation of
diverse perspectives. Besides being able to contribute to the meaningful control
of intelligent systems e.g. in the application domain of autonomous vehicles, AU
could also be utilizable for human agents in the policy-making domain where the
systems might propose ethically enhancing policy measures. Overall, we agree
with Goertzel [20] that the perverse instantiation problem seems rather not to
represent “a general point about machine intelligence or superintelligence”.
One of the main future challenges for the realization of AU could be the
circumstance that one can only strive to approximate ethical goal functions,
since a full utility elicitation on all possible future scenarios is obviously not
feasible. However, already an approximation process within a socio-technological
feedback-loop could lead to an ethical enhancement at a societal level. Besides
that, in order to achieve safe run-time adaptive artificial intelligent systems
reliably complying with ethical goal functions, a “self-awareness” functionality
might be required [1,41]. Moreover, the security of the utility function itself is
essential, due to the possibility of its modification by malevolent actors during
the deployment phase. In addition, it seems recommendable to require ethical
goal functions to be made publicly available e.g. for reasons of transparency
and successful AI coordination [2]. Finally, proactive AGI Safety research [1] on
ethical adversarial examples – a conceivable type of integrity attacks on the AGI
sensors having ethical consequences might be important to study in future work
to complement the use of safe utility functions.
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